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Whatever form Brexit takes (if it takes place), it will have major legal, economic,
practical and political consequences. An extension of the withdrawal date will
probably provide sufficient time for much needed scrutiny of the new Brexit
Deal negotiated between UK and the EU. It is in that light welcome that calls for
examination by both the House of Commons and the European Parliament are
now raised. An issue that has however not come up yet is whether the Withdrawal
Agreement complies with Article 50 TEU – a failure which might have profound
consequences.
While the short- and long-term economic and practical consequences for citizens
and business are of utmost importance in such scrutiny, the future legal and political
consequences might prove to be just as important. If the EU survives long enough
for Brexit to be seen as the past, there is a good chance that voices for withdrawal
in other Member States will (re)emerge. If that happens, Brexit will be the only
precedent and it will not matter at that point that it is now said that the solution is
a one-off. One issue where future exit negotiating teams may look back at Brexit
is whether the negotiations under Article 50 TEU can result in a legally binding
agreement on the permanent future relationship between the EU and the leaving
state.
The importance of this lies inter alia in the distribution of competences between the
EU and the Member States. An agreement reached under Article 50 TEU may, as
it seems, cover any issue of EU law, regardless if it is covered by the exclusive or
shared competence. In practice, if permanent relationships can be concluded with
Article 50 TEU as legal basis, that excludes national parliaments in the Member
States from the process (given that the agreement is not limited to issues covered
by the exclusive competence of the EU). As we have seen in the past (e.g. CETA)
national parliaments may have plenty to say on international agreements concluded
by the EU and its Member States.
Interpreting Article 50 TEU
According to Article 50.2 TEU, the EU shall negotiate and conclude an agreement
with the leaving state “setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account
of the framework for its future relationship with the Union”. This wording indicates
a difference between arrangements for the withdrawal on one hand and the future
relationship on the other. Furthermore, the framework for the future relationship
shall be taken into account whereas the arrangements for withdrawal shall be
set out. A literal reading of the article can easily lead to the conclusion that the
agreement reached under Article 50 TEU shall have legally binding provisions
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regarding the withdrawal but may only include non-binding provisions on the issue
of the future relationship. This is in line with the European Council’s conclusion that
an agreement on a future relationship can only be finalised and concluded once the
United Kingdom has become a third country.
When the EU negotiates and concludes international agreements, other provisions
of the Treaties apply, specifically Articles 207 and 218 TFEU. Article 207 TFEU
concerns the common commercial policy. It is stated in Article 207.3 TFEU that
“where agreements with one or more third countries or international organisations
need to be negotiated and concluded, Article 218 shall apply, subject to the special
provisions of this Article”. Article 218.1 TFEU states that “without prejudice to the
specific provisions laid down in Article 207, agreements between the Union and
third countries or international organisations shall be negotiated and concluded in
accordance with the following procedure”. In other words, international agreements
with third countries should be negotiated and concluded in accordance with the
provisions in Articles 207 and 218 TFEU, thus including approval by national
parliaments. There is no exception in relation to Article 50 TEU to be found in Article
207 TFEU. However, since the leaving state is still a Member State before the
withdrawal date an agreement under Article 50 TEU is not concluded with a third
country. Strictly interpreted, Articles 207 and 2018 TFEU are thus not applicable in
relation to the negotiations with the leaving state.
However, if one is to put Article 50 TEU versus Article 218 TFEU as to which of the
provisions provide the most suitable legal basis for the future agreement between
UK and the EU, the latter must prevail. The objective of Article 50.2 TEU is to
provide a pathway for the negotiations on withdrawal. The withdrawal in itself gives
rise to several questions including the rights of citizens and financial arrangements.
The future relationship is not necessarily closely interlinked with those issues.
I have so far only touched upon the interpretations of the relevant provisions of
the Treaties. However, I do not believe an exhaustive analysis can be made in
this context. My aim with this brief introduction to the issue is to conclude that it is
not clear without doubt whether an agreement covering the future relationship can
be concluded with Article 50 TEU as a legal basis. Nevertheless, there are good
arguments pointing to the conclusion that it cannot.
The New Brexit Deal
If it is accepted that the legal basis of Article 50 TEU only covers legally (in EU law)
binding agreements with the leaving state regarding the withdrawal itself and all
provisions that create a permanent future relationship fall outside the scope of Article
50 TEU, the question is inevitably: Does the Withdrawal Agreement legally bind the
EU and UK in a permanent future relationship?
I will focus here on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, even though there might
be elements in the other parts of the agreement that could be put to the same test.
The previous version of the Protocol (also referred to as the Backstop), included
articles explicitly stating it was not permanent. Article 1.4 stated that “the objective
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of the Withdrawal Agreement is not to establish a permanent relationship between
the Union and the United Kingdom”. Furthermore, Article 2 contained provisions on
subsequent agreements and the preamble recalled “that the Withdrawal Agreement,
which is based on Article 50 TEU, does not aim at establishing a permanent future
relationship between the Union and the United Kingdom”.
Applying above understanding of Article 50 TEU, the Backstop would have been
incompliant with the legal basis in Article 50 TEU because it might have had the
effect of a permanent future relationship. In practice, it would probably have been
proven difficult to conclude a subsequent agreement in time for the end of the
transition period. Furthermore, from a strict trade perspective it is difficult to imagine
an open border on the island of Ireland without Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Ireland being in the same customs territory or customs union. However, only
following the wording, it could be argued it was within the scope of Article 50 TEU
since it clearly stated it was not a permanent solution.
The new Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland includes none of the above-mentioned
guarantees that the solution is not permanent. Rather it must be regarded as a
permanent solution. It can only cease to apply with democratic consent of Northern
Ireland (Article 19 of the revised Protocol), a solution with much in common with
Article 50 TEU (Compare Wightman, C#621/18, para 65).
In summary, I am not saying that the new Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland
definitely falls outside the scope of Article 50 TEU, but I am equally not saying it
is not. As I remarked above, it should also be made clear that the aspects of this
issue have only been touched upon briefly. All I may conclude is that if there is an
extension of the withdrawal date, which gives both UK and the EU more time for
scrutiny, this is an aspect that must be looked into further.
The Jurisdiction of the ECJ
The ECJ is the last interpreter of the Treaties and it is up to the ECJ to resolve
issues of compliance with them (Article 19 TEU). However, it is not crystal clear
how to bring a case on this issue to the ECJ. Though, the most probable route must
be the special procedure to interpret an international agreement planned by the
EU before it enters into force. That jurisdiction follows from Article 218.11 TFEU.
There is no explicit legal link between Article 50 TEU and Article 218.11 TFEU but
this would probably not be a problem for the ECJ as the court has interpreted its
jurisdiction on this point widely. Furthermore, any argument implying the ECJ will
not have time to resolve the case, even if there is an extension, has no traction after
the Wightman case. In that case, a reference for preliminary ruling was made on 3
October 2018 and the final judgment was delivered on 10 December the same year.
The special procedure is only open to Member States, the European Parliament, the
Council or the Commission to use. It is unlikely any Member State would use this
opportunity given the political importance of the unified front of EU27, the same is
true for the Council. Furthermore, the Commission has no reason to test the legality
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of its own product. Consequently, it is up to the European Parliament to decide
whether to ask the ECJ for an opinion on this matter.
The Withdrawal Agreement can of course also be disputed in a national court which
could result in a reference for preliminary ruling but that requires the agreement to
enter into force. Practically, there is much to gain from testing the legality of any
agreement before it takes effect.
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